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RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE AFTER THE FALL OF COMMUNISM: FROM
EUPHORIA TO ANXIETY

Paul Mojzes, founder and editor

Paul Mojzes is a native of Yugoslavia and a United Methodist by religious affiliation. He
attended University of Belgrade Law School for two years, received an A.B. degree from Florida
Southern College and a Ph.D. degree from Boston University in church history with an emphasis
on Eastern Europe. Author or co-author of six and editor of 17 books, he also wrote over one
hundred articles. He was the co-editor of the Journal of Ecumenical Studies and is the founder
and editor-in-chief of Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe.

Prelude to the Great Transformation
In the decades prior to the implosion of the communist system, change could be discerned
here and there in Eastern Europe. The purpose of this article is to provide a general overview of
the most pertinent developments that spurred the transition from communism to post-communism,
employing some fairly broad brushstrokes to make my case.
As early as 1956 the Hungarians attempted a reform or revolt. Presumably a different
segment of Hungarian society had aspirations for change, but the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact countries were not prepared to allow them to be independent. The revolt was crushed by the
Red Army, and many years of bitter repression and persecution ensued. However, by the 1980s
the János Kádár regime began showing signs of flexibility in what some called “The Hungarian
Way” of greater intellectual and economic openness to the outside world; others coined the term
“goulash communism” to indicate greater attention to the standard of living. The reformist wing
of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party prevailed over the more rigid traditionalists, which
provided more “elbow room” even in church-state relations. They led the way toward the transition
to more liberty and by December 1989 the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party disbanded, opening
the path to multi-party democracy.
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In Poland, the election of Karol Cardinal Wojtila in 1978 as Pope John Paul II brought
seismic changes to that country. Beginning in 1980, the ascent of the “Solidarity” labor unionimplicitly supported by the influential Roman Catholic Church- caused a sharp reaction not only
within the Polish communist government, but an even more serious concern by the Soviet
leadership. This resulted in a dramatic imposition of martial law by Gen. Wojcieh Jaruzelski in
1981 and 1982, but ultimately it led to rapid liberalization after the second visit of John Paul II to
Poland and the martyrdom of the priest Jerzy Pospiełuszko in 1984. The Catholic Church’s open
sympathy for “Solidarity,” supporting its legalization, brought about increased political and
religious liberties, which enabled the transformation of Poland from communism to a pluralistic
democracy.
The election of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party
was of momentous importance not only for the Great Transformation but for the implosion of
communism in the entire Soviet orbit. His charismatic personality was a sharp departure from his
predecessors’ gerontocracy, and his reformist ideas, among which glasnost [transparency or
openness] and perestroika [restructuring—more than reform but less than revolution] were the
attention-getters, but did not at first initiate changes in the other countries of the bloc. However,
Gorbachev assured that the changes throughout Eastern Europe would not be prevented by the
Soviet Army as he promised not to interfere in their individual developments. At first religion in
the USSR was relatively unaffected; however, when the time came to observe the millennial
celebration of the Baptism of Rus’ in 1988, which may have been suppressed by his predecessors,
Gorbachev not only gave permission but--together with his wife--was seated next to Patriarch
Pimen during the festivities with Soviet TV broadcasting their friendly conversation to the country
and the world. The path was clear for major changes in church-state relations to occur in the mother
nation of communism, and this comparatively religiously-tolerant atmosphere eventually led to
the breakup of the USSR.
In the only majority Protestant country of the Eastern Bloc, the German Democratic
Republic, or better known in the West as “East Germany”, the delicate church-state relations had
been ambiguously named “Kirche im Sozialismus.” had its own very nuanced church-state
relations with little evidence that the leaders of the ruling Socialist Unity Party were inclined
toward further liberalization. But those in church and society who longed for change found their
inspiration in Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika, cleverly proclaiming an altered slogan, “Von
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der Sowjetunion zu lernen, heisst denken lernen.”1 Clearly that was not all that propelled the
changes. When in 1988, Hungary permitted East German visitors to cross into Austria as they fled
to West Germany, a series of events ultimately led not only to massive flights but to demonstrations
in Berlin, Leipzig, and elsewhere—with the active support of the churches. Such dramatic
pushback against the Socialist Unity party forced the regime to collapse. The most dramatic
symbol of the fall of communism and of the end of the Cold War was the dismantling of the Berlin
Wall on November 9, 1989. In a massive understatement, the East Germans called this Die Wende
[turning] or the Gentle Revolution. Many Americans prefer to give credit to Ronald Regan’s
appeal, “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall,” but that is a simplistic explanation. The Protestant
churches played an important though subtle role in this Great Transformation. Not long afterward
Germany was reunited and religious liberty attained, though the leveling turned out to be much
more difficult than anticipated.
The Czechoslovak Republic was another early bird seeking to achieve “socialism with a
human face” by means of the Prague Spring experience of 1968. The names of Alexander Dubček,
the prime minister, and Ludvik Svoboda, president, became well known throughout the world;
however, the noble aspirations of the majority of the population were crushed by Soviet tanks and
the militaries of the Warsaw pact. The Czechs and Slovaks found themselves deep in a Stalinist
winter in which almost all the reforms and freedoms of 1968 were reversed. Unlike the Hungarians
in 1956, they did not fight back but sullenly put up a passive resistance to the bitter persecutions;
this ensued for the next two decades, sustained by a vast secret police apparatus. Gorbachev’s
reforms also became a prelude to what the Czechoslovaks called their “Velvet” or “Gentle
Revolution” of November 1989. Though the resignation of the communist leadership took place
with surprising speed and relatively little violence, that peaceable path was prepared by religious
and secular dissidents organized in the informal civic association, “Charter 77.” Members of
Charter 77, of whom the playwright Václav Havel was the most famous, and similar intellectual
and civic groups were not merely against the violence of the communist system: but rejected its
moral malady. Havel was subsequently elected the first non-communist president of
Czechoslovakia. Regretfully, several years later the country split into the Czech Republic and the
Slovak Republic, albeit peacefully.

1

To learn from the Soviet Union means to learn to think.
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Concurrent with Havel’s election, the events in Romania were hurling toward a violent end
with the execution of its dictator Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife in the uprising; the dreaded
Securitate disbanded after it massacred many anti-Ceausescu demonstrators. The revolution began
“innocently” with an ethnic Hungarian Reformed pastor, Lászlo Tökés, preaching in the provincial
city of Timisoara against the repression of his church members by not so subtle attempts to
Romanianize them. Religious life in Romania, like in Poland was robust, but tightly controlled by
the government; Romanian nationalism caused favoritism for the Orthodox Church. Despite severe
control and general subservience of much of the churches’ leadership, there were some dissidents
and Hungarians of Hungary provided fairly open and vigorous support to their fellow ethnics in
Romania.

When Securitate roughed up Tökés, he was aggressively defended first by his

congregants, and then the wider population of Timisoara followed suit. His proponents guarded
him as the crowd grew around him. When the crowd became large enough, they decided to march
to center city; the secret police ultimately massacred many. It was like lighting a dynamo stick,
resulting in the largest number of casualties in the East European revolt during the Christmas of
1989. With the execution of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu, his personality cult came to an abrupt
end and Romania went on the path of recovery and membership in the European Union.
Throughout most of the communist period, Bulgaria was a reliable vassal to the Soviet
Union, and equally reliable in suppressing civil and religious liberties. Bulgaria held the majority
Bulgarian Orthodox Church on a short leash, providing just enough support for nationalistic
reasons to keep the majority Orthodox priesthood in obedience to the state. Even in these policies,
Bulgarian communists emulated their Soviet model. Only the Muslims of Bulgaria showed signs
of resistance after repeated attempts to homogenize them into Bulgarian ethnoreligiosity. In
November 1989, the long-serving head of the Communist Party, Todor Zhivkov, was pressured by
others in the leadership to resign. Within a month of his resignation, communist rule effectively
ended. Religious communities, particularly minorities, claimed for themselves religious liberties
and greater human rights for the Bulgarian population.
That only left the ultra-rigid and most repressive Communist regime in Europe, that of
Albania, standing into 1990. Albania was the poorest, least developed European country, with a
majority Muslim population; however, its Communist leader, Enver Hoxha, had declared all
religions illegal. He clung to the allegations that religion was irremediably evil, thereby making
Albania, by its own claim, the first atheist nation in the world. The destruction of religion, religious
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leaders, and objects was almost total. Only in May 1990 did the communist government remove
the longstanding prohibition to worship privately, and then in June 1990 did the first public
worship take place. The announcement that religious freedom and the rule of all would be
respected had to wait until November 8, 1990, when issued by Ramiz Alia of the Albanian Party
of Labor. It was only then that the constitutional prohibition of religion of 1976 was removed.
The above covers all traditional members of the Soviet Bloc. The Bloc was not nearly as
uniform as often perceived because Stalinist Albania broke away from subservience to the Soviet
Union when Khrushchev denounced Stalinism, and Ceausescu decided to challenge the diktat from
Moscow when he felt that it was at the expense of own vision for communist development of the
country. Yugoslavia is missing from the above narrative for the simple reason that, though socialist
of the communist variety, Yugoslavia broke away from the Bloc in 1948. Its leader, Josip BrozTito, decided the Soviet friendship was more like Soviet mastery and the famous Stalin-Tito rift
resulted in Yugoslavia’s exit from the Soviet orbit. At first that made little difference in the slavish
emulation of the Soviet model, including the repression of religion. Gradually, however, the rift
needed to be justified by theoretical reflections on Marxism-Leninism, thereby increasingly
challenging not only the Soviet theoretical model but even more so the Soviet practice. No man is
an island, and no country exists alone on planet earth, so Yugoslavia needed friends elsewhere and
found it among primarily in the non-aligned nations of the Third World and in masterful tight-rope
walking between West and East. Tito’s genius was his pragmatism and willingness to innovate in
order to provide more room to maneuver in the world and provide greater satisfaction for his multiethnic and multi-religious citizenry. By the 1960s, Yugoslav Marxists ventured into some bold
adaptation of Marxism along with openness to the West. While some old habits of repression of
civil and religious liberties lingered on, by the 1970s Yugoslavia was well on the way of being the
freest and most elastic Communist regimes in the world. Tito died in 1980 and the country behaved
for a while as if the slogan, “With Tito in life and with Tito in death” were real. True reality caught
up with Yugoslavs by the end of the turbulent decade with ethnoreligious tensions weakening the
federation. By January 1990 the League of Communists of Yugoslavia dissolved and soon
thereafter numerous primarily ethnic parties held elections that led by 1991 to incremental
secessions and ultimately war. Instead of becoming the first ex-communist country to join the
European Union, the country exploded in fratricidal and genocidal mutual destruction, which set
it decades, if not centuries, back. Yugoslavia was replaced by seven successor states: Slovenia,
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Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo, characterized by
unresolved problems and tensions. Each of the states had different church-state and religious
liberty issues.
Post-Communism
Thus, some thirty years ago, Communism imploded with surprisingly low levels of
violence—which regretfully was not entirely avoided, but arrived sporadically, reaching in the
1990s even genocidal dimensions. The news of the domino-like collapse of communist regimes,
from the German Democratic Republic and the fall of the Berlin wall, to the most repressive of the
regimes in Albania, was astonishing to watch and exhilarating to participate in. It is fair to describe
it as a feeling as euphoria. Large segments of the populations of the formerly communist countries
rejoiced and celebrated; those who had close associations with the previous system had reason to
fear their loss of positions and prestige. When the archives and files of the secret police were
opened to scrutiny in most but not all countries, the degree of entanglement of even some highly
positioned clergy came to the light and lead to recriminations. Persons outside the affected area,
especially in the West, also shared in the euphoria; some even expressed gleeful declarations of
victory in the Cold War, giving undue credit to Ronald Regan or Pope John Paul II, or the
“Solidarity” labor union in Poland or even declared it as “victory of Christianity over
communism.” In Russia, the person who wisely led the implosion, Mikhail Gorbachev, sank in
popularity to very low percentages as most Russians blamed him for the loss of their empire.
What was clear was that communism in Eastern Europe collapsed. With surprising speed,
thousands if not millions of former communists claimed either very tenuous engagement or
claimed having been coerced to cooperate with a system which they allegedly did not support in
their hearts. Soon it became hard to find people who openly stated their former Marxist
convictions. Two puzzling questions emerged: what to call the change, and what will be the
direction of the change. As mentioned above, the change was usually called a Revolution, usually
with a qualifier such as Velvet, Gentle, Silk, Wende [turning], or Perestroika [restructuring]. I used
the term Great Transformation in the subtitle of my book, Religious Liberty in Eastern Europe and
the USSR, which I began writing prior to these historic events. I fancied myself to be the first to
systematically publicize how the repression of religious liberty was carried out across decades in
all of the countries of Eastern Europe. Notably however, as I was writing, one after the other of
the regimes fell, and many of my professional insights gathered at great effort, suddenly became
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unveiled when the files of the Stasis or other security agencies and archives were made public.
With such massive departures from the structures of the communist system, new legislation and
governmental structures were being introduced in the various states. It became clear to me that the
book might only have historical importance if I concluded with the end of the communist laws and
practices. Therefore, I needed to write about the beginning of the new or altered legislation and
structures and ultimately it was necessary to add a sub-title, Before and After the Great
Transformation. It was not yet clear in which direction that “After” would go. Would it be
democracy? Some form of autocracy? A social democracy? Or something altogether new? The
word Post-Communism was uniformly accepted just because of its open-endedness and vagueness.
But what kind of church-state or religion-government arrangement would be adopted? In
the late 1980s Prof. Zdenko Roter, a sociologist from Ljubljana, Slovenia--at that time still a
liberal or humanistic Marxist—and I worked on creating a classification of the major types of
relationships of state with religious institutions. We came up with the following four models:
Type A – Ecclesiastical Absolutism – exclusive power is vested in a single religious institution
supported by the state. This model was widely used during the Middle Ages and is rare in the
contemporary world.
Type B – Religious Toleration – the state is separated from religions and is benign to all religions,
however, giving preference to the stronger churches but discriminating toward non-religious
citizens. This model is in wide use in most modern states.
Type C – Secularistic Absolutism – the state hinders all religious expressions and favors a single
secularist worldview. This model was used by communist governments.
Type D – Pluralistic Liberty – full exercise of freedom of religious or non-religious
convictions with a variety of truth claims, none supported or proscribed by the state. While still
rare in practice it is a model toward which a liberal democratic society might strive.
Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, most of the Eastern European societies belonged to Type
B, with some vestiges of a Type A society still in practice in tsarist Russia. The Marxist-Leninist
theory aimed to impose the Type C model, most successfully implemented in Albania and the
Soviet Union with suppressed vestiges of Type B mode combined with Type C in the other
communist countries. During the communist period, religious communities were persecuted-albeit unevenly--both within the Bloc and within a country. The previous rivalries between
religious groups appeared to diminish due to the restrictions imposed upon them that caused
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common suffering. It seemed that if these restrictions were to be lifted, the religious communities
in each country would eagerly strive to cooperate and share in full freedom of a Type D model.
The American pluralistic experience appeared to be worthy of emulating or even improving upon
if the communist control and restrictions were to be lifted. But this wasn’t to be.
When the Great Transformation from communism to post-communism took place thirty or
so years ago, I inquired about which model they would aspire to during my conversations with
various religious leaders in the region. Hardly any opted for Type D. They confirmed the
observation of many, including my own, that the “revolution” to post-communism was unlike
previous revolutions, all of which looked to the future in anticipation of improvement. But the
Central and East European and Eurasian “revolution” did not look so much to the future instead
looked sideways and backward for inspiration. The sideways look was toward the West—more so
toward western consumerism and freedom to travel than to its notions of liberty and human rights.
Catholic religious leaders looked to adopt the privileges enjoyed by Catholics in neighboring
Western countries. Orthodox leaders looked toward the privileged position of the Orthodox
Church in Greece. Both Catholics and Orthodox also looked to the past, to a period when they
were the established or a “state church” with privileges for their historic contribution to the nation.
Protestants hoped for financial and theological assistance from Protestant churches in the USA and
Western Europe. This they obtained, at times in exuberant measure, by uninformed zealots who
considered Eastern Europe an atheist hell hole just waiting to be “saved” by the various evangelists
and missionaries, mostly from the US and Scandinavia. Their financial resources and
contemporary methods often overwhelmed the traditionalist Orthodox and Catholics who were as
yet unable to compete in the free market of ideas. Russian Orthodox leaders pleaded with the
National Council of Churches in the USA to prevent the avalanche of evangelicals, not realizing
that there is no leverage or legal means to do so.
Instead of the hoped for harmony under the benign protection of equal freedom for all,
difficult adjustments took place throughout the region in the economy (rapacious dismemberment
of collective ownership with resulting unemployment and loss of social protection for the aged),
in social stratification (with a minority of oligarchs and conversely many descending into deep
poverty), and in conflict between various religions, some of which became privileged, whereas
atheists became disadvantaged. Frequently, power positions had been reversed and those who were
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previously oppressed seemed not to remember what it meant to be disadvantaged but were now
using their newly achieved social and political prominence to rub it in.
The positive development was that new legislation was passed in nearly all countries, at first
fairly evenhandedly awarding of liberties, but then gradually introducing restrictions toward
minority groups. Some countries immediately provided exclusive constitutional privileges to the
majority church. Then, under some pressure mostly from the outside, they yielded to a more
“generous” arrangement by discriminating between specifically named religions and then some
gradations to formally acknowledged religious institutions and to those religiously inspired civic
groups that were not granted the same legal status as the other religious institutions. For instance,
in the Russian Federation the government in practice emphasized the special status for Russian
Orthodoxy, while Judaism, Islam, Buddhism who were historically present in Russia were also
granted full legal recognition but enjoy lesser rights. Meanwhile, the government restricted the
rights of others, including Roman Catholicism, while the Jehovah’s Witnesses were outlawed. In
Northern Macedonia, the Constitution at first specified the unique position of the Macedonian
Orthodox Church, but subsequently, under western pressure, changed the constitutional provision
to specify five “historic” religions: Macedonian Orthodoxy, Islam, Roman Catholicism,
Evangelical Methodism, and Judaism. And so forth.
It is no longer unusual that, as in the past, certain countries are considered both unofficially,
but even officially as being, for instance, Catholic countries such as Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia,
Croatia, and Slovenia or Orthodox such as Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Serbia,
Montenegro, Romania, Moldavia, Georgia, and Armenia. Most of the former southern republics
of the Soviet Union, such as Azerbaijan, Turkestan, Kirghizstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan are considered Islamic. The degree of religiosity varies greatly in that, for instance,
Poland and Croatia are considered very Catholic, whereas Slovenia and the Czech Republic,
despite a majority Catholic population, are rather secular. Albania was and remains an anomaly in
that it made a radical about-face from being the most repressive atheist country to perhaps the most
tolerant country, in which there is relatively little hostility between the majority Muslim, and the
smaller Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant churches.
In most Eastern European countries, the symbiotic relationship between ethnicity or nation
and religion continues, deserves the coinage “ethnoreligiosity”. Ethnoreligiosity is among the
greatest culprits for tensions among and within Eastern European countries. Three of the former
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communist countries actually fell apart: Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. The most
“civilized” partition was that of the Czechs and Slovaks, who had the good sense, as the most
strident Yugoslavs noted condescendingly, to “count the chairs and decided who gets what.” Much
to the surprise of many at first there was no bloodshed when the Soviet Union broke up. Sure, there
had been a bloody attempt at secession in Chechnya, but it was eventually subdued. But then
Russian troops invaded parts of Georgia allegedly protecting the rights of Abkhasia and South
Ossetians to secede from Georgia. Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a bloody war over Nagorno
Karabakh. And lastly, President Putin decided that Crimea did not belong to Ukraine and annexed
it; then he provided military and other assistance to the rebels in eastern Ukraine (Donbas) aiming
to break away from Ukraine. That war is still ongoing with thousands of casualties. The bloodiest
was the disintegration and partition of the Yugoslavian federation in the 1990s and early decade
of the 21st century, which resulted in seven fairly unstable and conflict-ridden states: Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Northern Macedonia.
A more important political re-alignment took place when most of Soviet satellite states
chose to join the European Union and NATO to avoid potential Russian attempts to draw them
back into its sphere of influence. The three Baltic states that used to be Soviet republics, Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania, sought such safety, as did Poland, the Czech and the Slovak Republics,
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Croatia, while the other remaining Balkan states are
either candidates or aspirants for admission, with Albania and Montenegro already members of
NATO. Membership in EU and NATO often specify adherence to certain human rights and
democratic civil liberties, among which are freedom of religion and conscience that provide certain
protection even to minority religions, giving some hope in the long run that most of the countries
of the region might achieve the lofty status of the Type D model of Pluralistic Liberty.
The reason why euphoria gave way to anxiety are manifold. Many of the social protections
that were available under communism, such as right to employment, retirement pensions,
comprehensive health insurance, and educational opportunities have become much more fragile.
Capitalism as an economic system often came in its most rapacious form with cut-throat
competition, enormous corruption, and favoritism. Multiparty system elections did not necessarily
produce democracy and occasionally led to such great proliferation of political parties that people
had difficulty recognizing even their names, much less their platform. Wild swings from leftleaning to right-leaning parties and back took place in elections, as the confused electorate reacted
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impulsively to different stimuli, usually prompted by fear or anger. As is often the case in extreme
conflicts between freedom and security, usually the latter was chosen. Before too long, deep-seated
local affinities toward authoritarianism and even fascism came to the surface. There are few who
would not regard the rule of Vladimir Putin as being authoritarian. The close mutual support
between President Putin and Patriarch Kirill resulted in one of the many Eastern European political
religions, which has been described by an ecumenical officer in an Orthodox Church in America-with many years of close contacts with and love for the Russian Orthodox Church--as “clerofascist.” Attacks on Jews and Muslims, especially from the former southern Soviet republics are
noticeable.
Nationalism, sometimes reaching hysterical levels, is on the rise throughout Eastern
Europe. Dangerous rhetoric of hate is spewed even by high ranking religious officials domestically
and during their travels abroad. The war in Ukraine did not only affect tensions between a resurgent
Russia (which tries to revive its imperial reach) and the West (which tries to hem it in by expansion
of NATO) but caused a profound schism between the Patriarchates of Constantinople and
Moscow. In Poland and Hungary, politicians, like Jarosław Kaczyński and Viktor Orban
respectively, took a sharp turn to the right and autocracy with the support of many of the leading
religious figures in their country with their strong anti-immigrant positions and with pronounced
antisemitism and Islamophobia. Migrations by refugees from Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere from Asia
and Africa, who take the southeastern route to western Europe, often provoke very unfriendly
responses and erection of barb wire barriers along borders. Another response is local hysteria—
most notably among populations that themselves used to flee oppression and received a welcome
in the West; they are not emulating the kindness they had themselves encountered.
The atmosphere can sometimes be described not merely as anxious but as paranoid, which
almost always results in attacks against vulnerable minorities such as Roma (Gypsies), Jews,
Jehovah’s Witnesses, neo-Protestants, or whoever is disliked locally (e.g. Serbs in Croatia,
Croatians in Serbia, Bosniaks in the Republika Srpska, and between Serbs and Kosovars). A
number of the articles published in OPREE provide a more detailed report and analysis of these
threatening processes on a local scale.
From the above one might easily become thoroughly pessimistic, but viewed from a
religious perspective it is important, regardless of pessimism or optimism, to have hope. These are
human problems for which there are human solutions. Those who believe in God have the added
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reliance on a God who inclines the universe toward good. Intra-Christian ecumenism, best
evidenced in the European Ecumenical Assembly, such as those held in Basel (1980), Graz (1997),
and Sibiu (2007), which despite some disharmony ultimately trend toward the long-range solution
of conflicts and increased cooperation. The next Assembly of the World Council of Churches will
take place in Karlsruhe, Germany, in 2021 might spur more constructive cooperation.
Regionally, there is widespread identification of Islam as “jihadism,” causing exaggerated
fear among the population and an opportunity for political and religious leaders to manipulate this
anxiety. Local and world interreligious dialogues have helped not only the de-escalation of armed
conflicts but the creation of interreligious councils like those in Bosnia and Macedonia in the 1990s
and 2000s, which promoted cooperation and peacemaking. As much as some Western activists
sometimes contribute to interreligious conflict by means of their narrow denominational selfrighteousness enthusiasm, so do others help Eastern Europeans to cope more effectively with their
challenges with their skills for organizing dialogues and conflict management. The editorial staff
of Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe is dedicated not only to the understanding
and analysis of religious situations, but the promotion of dialogue, understanding, and peaceful
cooperation among all people who make up the religious mosaic of Eastern Europe. Therefore, we
intend to publish in this fortieth volume of OPREE reflections by our editors and by readers who
wish to register their observations. We hope that this will contribute to a better understanding of
the complex processes of one of the most profound changes of our time.
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